PhD candidate at Radboud University

Radboud University


Thom Wiggers is a PhD Candidate at the Institute of Computing and Information Sciences, Radboud University in The Netherlands. He is working on the interactions of post-quantum cryptography with protocols, under the supervision of Peter Schwabe.


  • Cryptography
  • Post-quantum Cryptography
  • Protocols
  • Information Security


  • MSc in Computing Science, 2018

    Radboud University Nijmegen

  • BSc in Computing Science (Informatica), 2015

    Radboud University Nijmegen

  • BSc in Information Sciences (Informatiekunde), 2015

    Radboud University Nijmegen


I have been involved as a teaching assistant in the following courses:

  • Functional Programming (2013-2017)
  • Operating Systems (2014-2017)
  • Object-Oriented Programming for Science students (2015)
  • Operating Systems Security (2016, 2017)
  • Hacking in C (2018, 2019)

See the teaching pages for course materials.

Recent Posts

Extract only needed citations from large bibfiles

I like to use cryptobib, because it gives me consistent results and it contains almost everything relevant to me. However, as crypto.bib is over 725000 lines long, parsing it to create the bibliography takes a long time. This means that my $\LaTeX$ compile jobs take much too long. I have now written a python script that will allow you to extract entries from large bibliographies. This script will take your biblatex .

Rephrasing TLS key exchange in terms of KEMs

In the RFC for TLS 1.3 ( RFC8446) especially, the key exchange is defined in terms of (EC)DH key shares being exchanged. This limits us to algorithms which support non-interactive key exchanges, while this is not necessary for the security of TLS 1.3 as defined by RFC8446.1 As we would like to implement (post-quantum) KEMs into TLS 1.3, we will now describe the changes to the spec that would be required.

Using (post-quantum) KEMs in TLS 1.3

The new TLS 1.3 standard [1] does not yet provide any support for post-quantum algorithms. In this blog post we’ll be talking about how we could negotiate a post-quantum key exchange using a (post-quantum) Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM). In the NIST Standardisation effort [2], many KEMs are currently under consideration.

Recent & Upcoming Talks

Solving LPN Using Large Covering Codes

Since quantum computers are expected to break most of the cryptographic schemes we rely on today, we need to look at alternatives. …

Recent Publications

Post-Quantum TLS without handshake signatures

We present an alternative to TLS 1.3, by authenticating using only Key-Encapsulation Mechanisms. This allows us to get rid of handshake signatures, as post-quantum signature schemes are expensive, both in bytes and computation times.

Energy-efficient ARM64 Cluster with Cryptanalytic Applications: 80 cores that do not cost you an ARM and a leg

Getting a lot of CPU power used to be an expensive under-taking. Servers with many cores cost a lot of money and consume large amounts …


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