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Verifying Post Quantum Signatures in 8kB of RAM
In this paper, we study implementations of post-quantum signature schemes on resource-constrained devices. We focus on verification of …
Ruben Gonzalez, Andreas Hülsing, Matthias J. Kannwischer, Juliane Krämer, Tanja Lange, Marc Stöttinger, Elisabeth Waitz, Thom Wiggers, Bo-Yin Yang
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Post-Quantum TLS without handshake signatures
We present an alternative to TLS 1.3, by authenticating using only Key-Encapsulation Mechanisms. This allows us to get rid of handshake signatures, as post-quantum signature schemes are expensive, both in bytes and computation times.
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Post-Quantum TLS with KEMs
We investigate getting rid of signatures in TLS
Thom Wiggers
Rephrasing TLS key exchange in terms of KEMs
In the RFC for TLS 1.3 (RFC8446) especially, the key exchange is defined in terms of (EC)DH key shares being exchanged. This limits us to algorithms which support non-interactive key exchanges, while this is not necessary for the security of TLS 1.
Thom Wiggers
Last updated on 2020-10-07 3 min read research
Using (post-quantum) KEMs in TLS 1.3

The new TLS 1.3 standard [1] does not yet provide any support for post-quantum algorithms. In this blog post we’ll be talking about how we could negotiate a post-quantum key exchange using a (post-quantum) Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM). In the NIST Standardisation effort [2], many KEMs are currently under consideration.

Thom Wiggers
Last updated on 2021-05-21 3 min read research
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