We make KEMTLS more efficient in scenarios where the client already has the server's long-term public key, for example through caching or because it's pre-installed.
We present an alternative to TLS 1.3, by authenticating using only Key-Encapsulation Mechanisms.
This allows us to get rid of handshake signatures, as post-quantum signature schemes are expensive,
both in bytes and computation times.
We investigate getting rid of signatures in TLS
I have a fairly creative ssl setup on my webserver:
I run my own ‘certificate authority’ which signs the server certificate; I have a bunch of alternative names specified; The CA certificate sits on an ePass 2003 PKI token. I’m writing down how I sign certificates in this context so I can use this to look up the procedure instead of spending hours in DuckDuckGo. This is more of a tutorial than elegant prose.
For crypto code it's important that it's time-invariant, otherwise it is vulnerable to timing attacks. I've had to build this time-invariant equality test from scratch, because I couldn't find something on Google. I hope it's useful to someone else.