Post-Quantum TLS without handshake signatures
Abstract
We present KEMTLS, an alternative to the TLS 1.3 handshake
that uses key-encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) instead of signatures for server authentication.
Among existing post-quantum candidates, signature schemes generally have
larger public key/signature sizes compared to the public key/ciphertext sizes of KEMs:
by using an IND-CCA-secure KEM for server authentication in post-quantum TLS, we
obtain multiple benefits. A size-optimized post-quantum instantiation of KEMTLS
requires less than half the bandwidth of a size-optimized post-quantum instantiation of TLS 1.3.
In a speed-optimized instantiation, KEMTLS reduces the amount of server CPU cycles
by almost 90% compared to TLS 1.3, while at the same time reducing communication size,
reducing the time until the client can start sending encrypted application data,
and eliminating code for signatures from the server’s trusted code base.
Type
Publication
Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Software
The raw data and software that accompanies this publication can be found at Github.
This protocol is the main subject of my PhD thesis.