Implementing and Measuring KEMTLS

2021-09-30·,
Armando Faz-Hernández
,
Nick Sullivan
,
Goutam Tamvada
,
Luke Valenta
,
Bas Westerbaan
,
Christopher Wood
· 0 min read
Abstract
KEMTLS (CCS 2020) is a novel alternative to the Transport Layer Security (TLS) handshake that integrates post-quantum algorithms. It uses a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) for both confidentiality and authentication, achieving post-quantum security while obviating the need for expensive post-quantum signatures. The original KEMTLS paper presents a security analysis, Rust implementation, and benchmarks over emulated networks. In this work, we provide full Go implementations of KEMTLS and several other post-quantum handshake alternatives, describe our integration into a real distributed system, and provide performance evaluations over real network conditions. We compare the standard (non-quantum-resistant) TLS 1.3 handshake with three alternatives: one that uses post-quantum signatures in combination with a KEM (PQTLS), one fully KEM application (KEMTLS), and a reduced round trip version (KEMTLS-PDK). In addition to the performance evaluations, we discuss how the design of these protocols impacts TLS from an implementation and configuration perspective.
Type
Publication
Progress in Cryptology — Latincrypt 2021
publications research
Authors
Armando Faz-Hernández
Authors
Nick Sullivan
Authors
Goutam Tamvada
Authors
Luke Valenta
Authors
Bas Westerbaan
Thom Wiggers
Authors
Senior Cryptography Researcher
Thom Wiggers is a cryptography researcher at PQShield. His PhD thesis was on the interactions of post-quantum cryptography with protocols, under the supervision of Peter Schwabe, at the Institute of Computing and Information Sciences, Radboud University in The Netherlands.
Authors
Christopher Wood