Implementing and Measuring KEMTLS
2021-09-30·,,,,,,·
0 min read
Armando Faz-Hernández
Nick Sullivan
Goutam Tamvada
Luke Valenta
Bas Westerbaan
Christopher Wood
Abstract
KEMTLS (CCS 2020) is a novel alternative to the Transport Layer Security (TLS) handshake that integrates post-quantum algorithms.
It uses a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) for both confidentiality and authentication, achieving post-quantum security while obviating the need for expensive post-quantum signatures. The original KEMTLS paper presents a security analysis, Rust implementation, and benchmarks over emulated networks.
In this work, we provide full Go implementations of KEMTLS and several other post-quantum handshake alternatives, describe our integration into a real distributed system, and provide performance evaluations over real network conditions.
We compare the standard (non-quantum-resistant) TLS 1.3 handshake with three alternatives: one that uses post-quantum signatures in combination with a KEM (PQTLS), one fully KEM application (KEMTLS), and a reduced round trip version (KEMTLS-PDK).
In addition to the performance evaluations, we discuss how the design of these protocols impacts TLS from an implementation and configuration perspective.
Type
Publication
Progress in Cryptology — Latincrypt 2021
Authors
Authors
Armando Faz-Hernández
Authors
Nick Sullivan
Authors
Goutam Tamvada
Authors
Luke Valenta
Authors
Bas Westerbaan

Authors
Senior Cryptography Researcher
Thom Wiggers is a cryptography researcher at PQShield.
His PhD thesis was on the interactions of post-quantum cryptography with protocols, under the supervision of Peter Schwabe, at the Institute of Computing and Information Sciences, Radboud University in The Netherlands.
Authors
Christopher Wood