Post-Quantum

We make KEMTLS more efficient in scenarios where the client already has the server’s long-term public key, for example through caching or because it’s pre-installed.

In this paper, we study implementations of post-quantum signature schemes on resource-constrained devices. We focus on verification of …

Talk about KEMTLS on Cloudflare TV

Talk about Post-Quantum TLS without Handshake Signatures at RWC 2021 (virtual).

Conference talk about Post-Quantum TLS without Handshake Signatures at ACM CCS (virtual).

Talk about Post-Quantum TLS without Handshake Signatures at the Lorentz Workshop (virtual)

Department Lunch Talk about KEMTLS

We present an alternative to TLS 1.3, by authenticating using only Key-Encapsulation Mechanisms. This allows us to get rid of handshake signatures, as post-quantum signature schemes are expensive, both in bytes and computation times.

We investigate getting rid of signatures in TLS

In the RFC for TLS 1.3 (RFC8446) especially, the key exchange is defined in terms of (EC)DH key shares being exchanged. This limits us to algorithms which support non-interactive key exchanges, while this is not necessary for the security of TLS 1.3 as defined by RFC8446.1 As we would like to implement (post-quantum) KEMs into TLS 1.3, we will now describe the changes to the spec that would be required. As we can phrase (EC)DH key exchange as a key exchange with Key Encapsulation Mechanisms, this does not actually change TLS.